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European Food-Labeling Policy: Successes and Limitations
Jean-Christophe Bureau and Egizio Valceschini
The EU policy on voluntary food labeling emphasizes the geographical origin of the products. Specialty products from 
a given area (e.g., wine) benefit from a reputation premium that is well-identified by consumers. Public authorities al-
low exclusive use of the appellation to a group of producers in exchange for commitments on production techniques, 
certification and control, and obligation of a collective use of the name. In spite of many successful aspects, the future 
of this policy is uncertain in a globalized environment. Caveats in the regulation (moral hazard, bureaucracy), lack 
of international readability of the labels, and competition from registered brand names are the main limitations of the 
EU policy.
the consumer as to the product’s characteristics or 
effects.1 Mandatory labeling includes the list of in-
gredients; net quantity; date of minimum durability; 
special conditions for keeping or use; and the name 
of the manufacturer, packager, or a vendor estab-
lished in the Community. It is noteworthy, though, 
that provenance must only be indicated when the 
omission of such information might mislead the 
consumer; in most cases it is not required to indi-
cate the origin of products. It is also noteworthy 
that a full nutritional labeling (like in the U.S.) is 
not mandatory. Unlike in the U.S., the presence of 
genetically modified ingredients in a product must 
be indicated. Specific additional labeling is required 
for food containing additives and/or flavorings that 
have been genetically modified or have been pro-
duced from genetically modified organisms. 
Organic Products
The EU regulation protects the denominations “bio-
logical” and “organic,” sets production rules and 
standards, and defines the procedures of control and 
inspection. An organic agricultural product must 
result from production methods that ban the use 
of synthetic pesticides and fertilizers. Production 
methods must be based on the recycling of organic 
natural ingredients, on the use of natural ways for 
fighting insects, and on crop rotation. They must 
respect a plan for converting land to organic prac-
tices. Additives, conservation agents, disinfection, 
and cleaning must rely on natural products. Geneti-
cally modified organisms cannot benefit from the 
label. Organic animal products are regulated in a 
specific way. Livestock production must not cause 
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There are considerable differences between 
North American and European consumers con-
cerning the relevant quality attributes of a food 
product, including nutritional content, taste, pro-
duction methods, and authenticity (Bureau and 
Marette 2000). Many Europeans consider that the 
soil, climate, and traditional know-how that exist 
in a region have a decisive influence on product 
quality. That is, a significant share of European 
consumers—particularly in France, Italy, Spain, 
and Greece—are receptive to quality signals that 
associate quality with geographical origin. While 
the regulation on mandatory labeling only shows a 
few differences between the EU and the U.S., the 
EU policy on voluntary food labeling now strongly 
emphasizes the link with the production region. In 
spite of many successful aspects, the EU policy 
has several unwanted effects. The limitations of 
this policy are becoming more apparent with the 
globalization of the food market and the increasing 
competition of private signs of quality. The objec-
tive of this paper is to describe the EU voluntary 
and mandatory labeling policies. In the first section 
we present the main features of the EU legislation; 
then we present some of the main successes; finally, 




The EU legislation on the labeling of foodstuffs 
prevents presentation and advertising to mislead 
1 Council Directive 2000/13/EC on labeling, presentation, 
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pollution of soil and water; in addition, animals 
must be fed with organic feedstuffs that are grown 
on the farm or nearby, the breed must be chosen so 
as to maintain biological diversity, animals must 
be born on the farm, and they must be raised free-
range. Animal-welfare considerations are also taken 
into account, including conditions of transportation 
and slaughtering. The use of growth-promoting sub-
stances (hormones) is not allowed.
Voluntary Labeling: PDOs and PGIs
Several European countries have long developed 
regulations governing the use of some geographical 
names to protect regional production and improve 
marketing. France has been a pioneer in this area, 
with protected appellations that date back to the 
sixteenth century for Roquefort cheese. These regu-
lations were then extended at the EU level.2 The 
1992 EU framework for protecting and promoting 
quality products focuses on traditional products and 
products from a designated origin.
Three systems of identification have been imple-
mented: the protected designation of origin (PDO), 
the protected geographical indication (PGI) and the 
traditional specialty guaranteed (TSG). PDO is used 
to describe foodstuffs that are produced, processed, 
and prepared in a given geographical area using 
recognized know-how, when the origin determines 
the quality of the product (e.g., a wine that can only 
be produced on a particular soil and in a specific 
climate). In the case of the PGI, the geographical 
link must occur in at least one of the stages of pro-
duction, processing, or preparation. A TSG does not 
refer to origin but highlights traditional character, 
either in the composition or means of production. 
The general rationale for such labeling is that 
these products have developed a reputation, associ-
ated with the place of production that makes them 
more valued by consumers. Ham sold as Parma, 
for example, should come only from that product’s 
traditional region of origin and should be made ac-
cording to traditional methods so as not to mislead 
consumers. Products from other areas or made by 
other methods would have to be sold under different 
names. At the same time, other product names were 
designated as generic (including some cheese, such 
as emmenthal or camembert) and can be used for 
goods made anywhere and by any methods. 
In all cases, the label requires that inspection, 
control, and certification be made by an independent 
third party, accredited by the public regulator. The 
ownership of the name PDO or PGI is collective. 
All farmers belonging to the defined geographical 
area and respecting the specifications have the right 
to use the geographical name recognized by the 
appellation of origin.
EU Labels at the National Level
In EU member states, national regulations on food 
labeling must comply with the general EU frame-
work. That is, the French legislation on “Appela-
tion d’Origine Contrôlée,” or AOC, is a national 
translation of the EU legislation on “Protected 
Designation of Origin.” The coexistence of EU 
and national labels results in a multiplicity of labels 
that damages their informational value. The French 
case illustrates the complex articulation between the 
EU framework and national policies. There are five 
official food quality labels in France: the AOC, the 
“Label Rouge” (a trademark that is a property of 
the French Ministry of Agriculture) for high-quality 
products, the certificate of conformity, the certified 
organic mode of production, and the label “moun-
tain” that certifies that the good originates from a 
mountainous (i.e., disadvantaged) area. 
In all cases, these are voluntary labels and their 
attribution relies on terms of reference that go be-
yond the regular production methods used in the 
industry. For example, in France a product that ben-
efits from one of the five forms of labeling listed 
above must be certified by an accredited organiza-
tion that is independent from producers. 
Successes of the EU Labeling Policy
The EU policy of PDO and PGI has been successful 
in promoting differentiated products. There are now 
some 572 agricultural products protected in the EU, 
including 339 PDOs and 214 PGIs. Countries that 
had a long tradition in linking quality to geographi-
cal origin (France, Italy, Spain) account for most of 
the protected products, but some countries such as 
Germany (53 PDOs in 2000) have taken advantage 
of the EU regulation. While wine was originally the 
main sector that benefited from PDOs, there are now 
143 protected denominations for cheese. 
2 On 14 July 1992 the Council adopted Regulation (EEC) No 
2081/92 improving the protection of designations of origin for 
agricultural products intended for human consumption, which 
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The economic importance of PDOs and other 
labels is significant. In France, the gross income 
of the PGI chain in 2000 was close to 800 million 
euros, an increase from 1999 of 20%. Wine under 
AOC (i.e., the national version of PDO) accounts 
for roughly 13 billion euros and liquor for roughly 
1.5 billion euros in France. The combination of the 
two is the largest net exporting sector. Cheese and 
dairy products under AOC amounted to roughly 7 
billion euros, close to 20% of total sales of French 
cheese. 
The growing economic importance of the sector 
and the fact that more and more consumers, espe-
cially in Northern Europe, have become familiar 
with the labels of origin and associate them with 
quality testifies to the success of the EU policy. 
There are also some indirect positive aspects of this 
policy, such as the traceability, that have impacted 
the food chain, even for non-labeled products.
Traceability
The implementation of product traceability has 
been a positive outcome of the EU policy on food 
quality labels even though that was not its primary 
purpose. Because guarantee of origin requires con-
trol by a third party, the 1992 legislation has had 
an important role in defining and testing methods 
for ensuring traceability. The experience proved 
useful after the BSE (i.e., “mad cow”) crisis when 
generalized traceability was imposed by the retail-
ing sector for a whole range of products (e.g., beef). 
Traceability of the products benefiting from a label 
of origin also increased consumer confidence. It 
is noteworthy that during food crises such as the 
“mad cow” issue, as well as other panics involving 
dioxin in Belgium, chemical residues in Germany, 
etc., products designated by one of the voluntary 
labels mentioned above did not suffer from the fall 
in demand.
Impact on Production Methods
An indirect impact of the EU regulation on volun-
tary labels is the rationalization of production meth-
ods in a way that promoted improved practices. The 
terms of references of the labels have introduced 
self-discipline among the producer organization that 
managed the appellation. For example, in some la-
beled cheeses, producers banned the use of silage 
grass in feeding dairy cows and shifted to dry hay 
because of the negative effect (acidity) of the silage 
on milk and, therefore, on the taste of the cheese. 
This has had the effect of reducing the introduction 
of telluric germs in feedstuffs, and the increased 
hygiene has enhanced consumer confidence in 
labeled products. 
In the wine sector, the terms of reference of the 
appellation required replanting with traditional but 
higher-quality types of grapes. This has contrib-
uted to the considerable improvement of wine in 
some regions such as southern France or Italy. The 
terms of reference of some AOC and the quality 
label “Label Rouge” has imposed a lower stocking 
density for poultry. Constraints on the number of 
chickens per square meter or the imposition of free-
ranging have increased animal welfare, allowing 
these products to be recommended by the powerful 
animal-welfare groups.
Farm Income
The EU regulation on quality labels relies on a de 
facto contract between the regulator and the produc-
ers. Exclusive use of a geographical name requires 
producers to become collectively organized; that is, 
they must create a producer organization in order 
to manage the use of the appellation. This makes it 
possible to control, coordinate, and implement the 
right incentives for sound collective management 
of the label. By allowing the use of a well-known 
name, the regulator enables the collective organiza-
tion of producers to reap the benefits of a reputation 
rent, without incurring all the costs that a private 
company has to incur when it has to establish the 
reputation of a commercial brand name. In that 
way, the appellation of origin has proved success-
ful in allowing even small producer groups to ben-
efit from a well-established reputation. The whole 
system organizes some sort of “cartelization” of the 
group of producers that benefit from the exclusive 
use of the positive externality of the label so that 
they capture the value added. In many cases it has 
helped regional economies that could not compete 
in a non-differentiated market, such as marginal 
agricultural areas or areas with difficult access to 
large consumption centers.
Regional Economy Impact
The link between the quality label and the pro-
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image of a particular territory or region. The posi-
tive externality benefits the whole region through 
higher prices paid to the producers, a reputation that 
encourages tourism, and promotion of processed 
products. That is, at least in the most successful 
cases, linking the quality label to the origin of the 
product has generated a virtuous circle for rural 
development. 
Mahé and Ortalo-Magné (2001) explain how the 
strategy of linking quality labels to the origin of the 
product has had a considerable positive effect for 
rural development in particular regions. Differen-
tiated goods that can be imitated by competitors 
seldom translate into higher income for producers 
in the long run because the entry of new competi-
tors drives the producer rent to zero. If the good 
produced cannot be imitated because of a patent 
or a brand name, it is often the shareholders who 
eventually capture all the rent. 
If the differentiation rent is linked to the geo-
graphical origin, the rent will capitalize into those 
factors of production that are required to produce 
the good: labor; specific producers skills that may 
be needed; and land or intellectual property rights, if 
the name of the product is protected by a label based 
on the geographical location, such as a PGI. This 
is a fundamental difference between labels linked 
to origin and labels certifying that the product is 
“of high quality” or “organic,” where free entry 
drives the rent to zero. The economic mechanism 
explains that farm producers, even in less-favored 
areas, that benefit from a PDO or IGP tend to be 
relatively well-off. It also explains the high market 
price of vineyards inside the region benefiting from 
a PDO, compared to those that are only a few miles 
outside.
Cost-efficient Policy
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been 
criticized for imposing considerable costs on 
taxpayers and consumers. By encouraging bulk 
production, CAP mechanisms—such as the public 
purchase of excess supply in order to maintain a 
guaranteed price for the main commodities--have 
sometimes led to massive quantities of products of 
low quality (e.g., a low-quality wine that cannot 
find buyers or low-quality wheat that sells poorly 
on the world market). In contrast, the EU regulation 
on food-quality labeling provides a market-based 
form of regulation that makes it possible to segment 
markets and differentiate products in a much more 
efficient way than classical CAP instruments. It is 
noteworthy, for example, that quality wine (AOC) 
and liquors are net exports among agricultural and 
food products in France and have not received 
support from public funds. Exports of AOC wine 
and liquors increased by 5% in 2002, while the 
exports of the products that receive high subsidies 
and support (cereals, sugar) experienced a signifi-
cant decrease. At some point, it is the regulation 
on quality products, not the CAP, that has made it 
possible for the EU agricultural sector to express 
its economic potential.
Limitations of the EU Labeling Policy
There are nevertheless several caveats in the present 
EU policy on voluntary labeling that raise questions 
about the future of the policy in an increasingly 
integrated market.
International Recognition
In countries such as France or Italy, consumers are 
aware of the local food traditions and of the pro-
duction techniques specific to a given area, and are 
often willing to pay more for acquiring a good from 
a particular origin (Vogel 1995; Lucatelli 1999). 
In other countries, quality is associated more with 
a set of rules on safety, integrity, or conformity to 
industrial processes. Because consumers do not 
place a particular value on products originating 
from a specific geographical area, there is no point 
in protecting appellations and traditional know-how. 
The use of EU appellations (Champagne, Chablis, 
Porto, Parmesan, etc.) in other countries is often 
seen by Europeans as fraud. In the ongoing round 
of multilateral negotiations, the EU considers that a 
deeper international protection of its appellations is 
a requirement for any agreement on agriculture. At 
the same time (April 2003) the U.S. and Australia 
challenged the EU regulation of origin (seen as mere 
protectionism) in the WTO. This illustrates how 
skeptical other countries are about the EU notion 
of linking quality and origin.
The fact that EU denominations are sometimes 
“counterfeit” in other countries is perhaps a less 
important issue than the lack of identification by 
non-EU consumers of the EU system of promot-
ing high-quality products, which is a major caveat 
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of the EU official quality, the most widely known 
names of French wine in the U.S. are those of com-
panies that have registered brands (e.g., Chateau 
Margaux, Georges Duboeuf, Mouton-Cadet), even 
though these brands also use geographical appella-
tions (i.e., Bordeaux, Beaujolais, Médoc, etc.). This 
suggests that a well-promoted brand name can be a 
more efficient marketing instrument than an official 
EU quality label.
Bureaucracy
The EU regulation, with a decentralized system of 
definition of the labels, has raised the opportunity 
of political collusion. The influence of particular 
lobbies in the definition of the terms of reference or 
of the exact area to which an appellation is granted 
(given the huge consequences on the price of land, 
for example, in the case of wine) has been a recur-
rent problem in France. The adoption of the legisla-
tion at the EU level and the fact that supranational 
authorities now scrutinize the decision enhance the 
transparency but add administrative procedures. In 
addition to being quite bureaucratic, the procedure 
of accreditation of a PDO or PGI can also lead to 
overprotection of traditional production techniques. 
The terms of references imposed on PDO products 
can act as an obstacle to innovation. For example, 
some innovations in the wine sector (e.g., new meth-
ods for separating juice and grape must) cannot be 
used by AOC winemakers, on behalf of maintaining 
the tradition. The technological gap between AOC 
wine and wine produced in industrial wineries is 
likely to become larger in the future, with the adop-
tion of genetically modified grapes by competitors 
of AOC wine. If these innovations translate into 
what is perceived as a higher quality by the con-
sumer, it is likely that the respect for tradition will 
act against the AOCs. Already, the obligation of 
manual harvesting in some AOCs may have acted 
against the competitiveness of such wines.
Quality (Moral Hazard)
PDO and PGI labels are provided to a group of 
producers. That is, they are collective brands, 
and the producer organization is in charge of the 
management and the implementation of the terms 
of reference, so that production, processing, and 
preparation will take place in the geographical area 
specified. The collective property of the indication 
of geographical origin is one major weakness of the 
EU system. All producers in the area that satisfy 
the terms of reference of the label can use it and 
benefit from the positive externality of the collec-
tive reputation. This leaves room for moral hazard 
and opportunistic behavior. In spite of the need for 
certification by a third institution, the collective 
management of an immaterial asset (the image of 
the product) raises difficult questions of coordina-
tion (Valceschini, Mazé, and Torre 1995). In some 
cases, free riding and difficulties of management 
have led to a loss of reputation for the collective 
quality signal—the variance in quality within a 
large appellation such as Beaujolais wine seems to 
be responsible for decreasing market shares.
Competition Issues
The organization of the EU legislation and the 
exclusive right given to a group of producers to 
use a particular denomination has raised the issue 
of competitiveness. The issue is particularly well-
documented in Buccirossi, Marette, and Schiavina 
(2002). In several EU countries, producer organi-
zations and firms that benefited from an official 
quality label have been accused of, and sometimes 
fined for, anticompetitive practices. There is a fine 
line between organized cartellization in the public 
interest and undue barriers to entry set by a small 
group of producers.
The Future of the EU Policy
There are several questions about the future of EU 
policy on quality labeling. First, it is unlikely that 
non-EU countries will recognize, let alone adopt, 
the EU system where a quality label is linked to the 
geographical origin of a product. Most countries 
see in the EU regulation a way to prevent foreign 
producers from signaling the high quality of their 
food products. It is possible that this will change in 
the future; China could, for example, join the EU 
demand for more recognition of denomination of 
origin for traditional products such as the Shaox-
ing wine, the Lon Jing tea, or the Xuanwei ham. 
However, a general adoption of the EU concept is 
unlikely, and Chen (1996) explains why the future 
of the EU appellations of origin in a globalized 
world is, at best, uncertain.
Large-scale industries are able to offer high-qual-
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“authenticity,” i.e., the fact that a product is “typi-
cal” of a particular region. Clearly, the fast growth 
of Californian and Australian wine (under registered 
wineries names) in the EU wine market shows that 
high-quality products sold under a brand name are 
likely to be easily accepted by consumers and that 
“authenticity” is not always a quality attribute that 
drives purchasing decisions (Conseil Economic et 
Social 2001).
Another risk for the ability for a PDO/PGI to sig-
nal a differentiated product is that there are regional 
brands that emphasize the notoriety of the region, 
outside the PGI framework. This is a strategy fol-
lowed by the industry in some particular regions 
in Europe (Emilie-Romagna and Tuscany in Italy, 
Asturia in Spain, etc.), and it confuses consumers. 
Another source of uncertainty about the future of 
the EU food-labeling policy is the emergence of new 
criteria that are seen as relevant as quality attributes. 
Consumers now focus more than in the past on the 
environmental characteristics of the goods, on the 
multifunctional nature of the production methods 
(protection of landscape, natural resources, animal 
welfare), and on food safety (Bureau and Marette 
2000). The official labels such as the PDO/PGI 
account for some of these characteristics (e.g., 
production methods that require free-range animal 
production, etc.). Nevertheless, the lables are not 
central in terms of reference. Some private brands, 
and in particular retailer brands within Europe, base 
the differentiation of their products on character-
istics that are seen as more and more important 
by consumers. A label “sustainable agriculture,” 
“animal friendly,” or “free-range” could become 
more palatable or more readable for consumers than 
a label that emphasizes the origin of the product 
(Valceschini and Mazé 2000).
Conclusion
Overall, it is likely that major changes will be re-
quired in the EU labeling policy in spite of its ac-
complishments. So far, PDOs and PGIs have been 
quite successful in promoting quality products 
within the EU and in ensuring that farm producers 
capture a significant share of the rent associated 
with the product differentiation. Nevertheless, in the 
future, and especially in markets that are becoming 
more integrated, commercial brand names could be 
more visible. Brand names also benefit from stron-
ger legal protection, making them perhaps a more 
efficient instrument than the present EU labels and 
appellations. Already, some producers attempt to 
combine the reputation of a brand name with the 
credible signal of an official quality label. 
The fact that virtually no non-EU product 
has benefited from the status of the EU PDO or 
PGI suggests that the system has been used in a 
discriminatory way to help the promotion of EU 
products (note that the EU organic food label has 
been granted to products that satisfy the specific 
EU terms of references, including references for 
countries such as Argentina). 
However, the role of the EU system of voluntary 
labels as a significant trade barrier seems relatively 
limited. Clearly, there are major economic conse-
quences of protecting well-known names such as 
Champagne or Parmesan, especially if they are pro-
tected in third markets by international agreements, 
but this is more a classical intellectual-property is-
sue than a non-tariff barrier issue. The protection 
that the PDO/PGI label grants to domestic products 
should not be overestimated. It took centuries to 
have consumers associate the region of origin with 
quality in the case of Bordeaux or Burgundy wine 
in Europe; it has only taken a few years for some 
Californian and Australian wineries to become 
household names in Europe. The recent increase 
in sales of wine identified by brand name or type 
of grapes in the EU market suggests that efficient 
marketing strategies for differentiating quality prod-
ucts could successfully compete with the official 
EU quality signs and even, perhaps, “crash France’s 
wine and cheese party,” to use an expression by 
Chen (1996).
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